US Hegemony, Economic Integration and Monetary Regionalism in East Asia by Nordhaug, Kristen
 
  
 
Aalborg Universitet
US Hegemony, Economic Integration and Monetary Regionalism in East Asia
Nordhaug, Kristen
Publication date:
2001
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Nordhaug, K. (2001). US Hegemony, Economic Integration and Monetary Regionalism in East Asia. Research
Center on Development and International Relations, Aalborg University, Denmark.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: November 29, 2020
 
 
 
 US Hegemony, Economic 
Integration and Monetary 
Regionalism in East Asia 
 
 
 Kristen Nordhaug 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH SERIES 
 RESEARCH CENTER ON DEVELOPMENT 
 AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (DIR) 
 
 WORKING PAPER NO. 112 
 
 IN
S
T
IT
U
T
E
F
O
R
H
IS
T
O
R
Y
,I
N
T
E
R
N
A
T
IO
N
A
L
A
N
D
S
O
C
IA
L
S
T
U
D
IE
S
A
A
LB
O
R
G
©  2002 Kristen Nordhaug 
 Research Center on Development and International Relations (DIR) 
 Aalborg University 
 Denmark  
 Development Research Series 
 Working Paper No. 112 
 
ISSN 0904-8154 
 
Published by 
DIR & Institute for History, International and Social Studies 
Aalborg University 
 
Distribution 
Institute for History, International and Social Studies 
Secretariat, room 106 
Fibigerstraede 2 
DK-9220 Aalborg East 
Phone + 45 96 35 83 91 
E-mail: kramer@humsamf.auc.dk 
 
Lay-out and wordprocessing 
Jette Jensen Al-Naseri 
 
Print 
Centertrykkeriet, 2002 
 
The Secretariat 
Research Center on Development and International Relations 
att: Secretary Marianne Hoegsbro 
Fibigerstraede 2 
Aalborg University 
DK-9220 Aalborg East  
Denmark 
 
Tel. +  45 96 35 98 10 
Fax. + 45 98 15 32 98 
 
E-mail: hoegsbro@humsamf.auc.dk or jds@humsamf.auc.dk 
Homepage: www.humsamf.auc.dk/development 
 
 
 
 
 1
US Hegemony, Economic Integration and Monetary Regionalism in 
East Asia* 
 
Kristen Nordhaug** 
 
Introduction  
In May 2000 a meeting of East Asian finance ministers in Chiang Mai in Thailand 
agreed on a regional monetary co-operation arrangement which would include the 
so-called ASEAN+3, i.e. the ASEAN countries along with Japan, South Korea and 
China. This has been followed up with discussions about an ASEAN+3 Free Trade 
Zone since November 2000.  
 
It is still an open question whether these initiatives will succeed. In the 1990s 
initiatives for encompassing East Asian regional integration failed ore were 
watered down. These efforts took place in rivalry with US-supported trans-Pacific 
‘open regionalism’ and global organizations: The East Asian Economic 
Group/Caucus (EAEC) v. APEC in the early 1990s and the Asian Monetary Fund 
(AMF) v. the IMF during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The East Asian Economic 
Group initiative came from Malaysia, while Japan was invited to assume leadership 
within the group. Yet the Japanese government declined to respond, probably 
because it worried about disturbances to its relations with the United States and 
regional dislike of a high-profile Japanese position. The outcome was a watered-
down compromise where an East Asian Caucus was established as a subgroup 
within the APEC framework (Higgott and Stubbs 1995). 
 
During the Asian financial crisis in 1997 Japan’s Ministry of Finance proposed a 
US$ 100 billion regional Asian Monetary Fund to provide quick emergency funds 
for stabilization of regional currencies, with most of the funding from Japan. This 
scheme was however strongly resisted by the United States that supported full 
control by the IMF of emergency funds. China also expressed opposition against 
Japanese ‘yen hegemony’. Japan withdrew its proposal, and the IMF assumed 
control over the rescue funds.1 
 
Thus US dominance, Japanese reluctance to abandon its alliance with the United 
States and regional distrust regarding Japan seem to be major impediments to East 
                                                          
* A previous version of this paper was presented at the XIII Nordic Political Science Association 
meeting, Workshop Session 23 on Regions and regionalization, Aalborg 15-17 August 2002. 
** Associate Professor, Department of Geography and International Development Studies, 
Roskilde University. 
1 The AMF episode will be discussed further in section 3.  
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Asian regional organization. In the present paper these obstacles are related to 
cleavages in the regional East Asian state system with historical roots in the pre-
1945 imperialist order and the regional Cold War order from the late 1940s until 
the early 1970s. These issues are discussed in part 1. Problems of East Asian 
monetary integration are also related to more recent features of East Asian 
development models, regional economic integration and the region’s relationship 
with the refashioned US financial hegemony of the post-Bretton Woods period. 
These issues are discussed in part 2. The paper then discusses East Asian projects 
of monetary integration since 1997 in part 3. The paper concludes with an 
assessment of the impediments that the new initiatives will have to overcome. The 
discussion focuses on Japan; the East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries 
(EANICs), South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore; the ‘second 
generation’ industrializers in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Thailand (ASEAN-4); and China. 
 
1. The East Asian state system 
Japanese imperialism and the Cold War  
Most states of East and Southeast Asia have been European, US or Japanese 
colonies and did not become independent until the end of World War II. During the 
period from the 1840s to the 1940s the previous uncontested regional hegemonic 
power China was suffering heavily from the combined impact of domestic unrest, 
political fragmentation and imperialist infringement. Japan on the other hand 
managed to withstand Western imperialist pressure and developed into a regional 
imperialist power on her own in Northeast Asia. Japan’s expansion took place at 
the expense of the (pre-1911) Chinese Empire and (post-1911) Nationalist China. 
Her major colonies had previously been part of the Chinese Empire (Taiwan, 
Manchuria) or were located within the Chinese sphere of interest (Korea).  
 
In the 1930s Japan started to build up a regional war economy with the 
development of military-related heavy industry, an increasingly self-reliant regional 
division of labor and import-substituting industrialization within her colonial 
empire. The Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 was followed by 
occupations of large tracts of China in 1937-38 and most of Southeast Asia in 1941. 
Japanese authorities developed the pan-Asian anti-Western notion of a Japan-led 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere that justified their invasions of the Western 
colonies of Southeast Asia. 
 
The Pacific Wars of 1937-45 destabilized the region. Western colonists were 
ousted in Southeast Asia while the Nationalist government of China was weakened. 
The situation was destabilized further by the sudden capitulation of Japan in 1945. 
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This created a geopolitical vacuum and strengthened various forms of anti-colonial 
and nationalist movements. Communist parties throughout the region gained 
nationalist credentials and military experience from their fight against the Japanese 
and were frequently able to strengthen their position after the Japanese capitulation. 
In that respect Japanese imperialism prepared for the military strength and popular 
appeal of the Communist sides in the three important post-World War II regional 
civil wars of China, Korea and Vietnam, with strong US involvement on the non-
communist side in the latter two.  
 
The US Cold War strategy from the late 1940s was to promote regional integration 
of US allies centered around the defeated regional adversaries of World War II, 
West Germany and Japan, while economic and political contacts with the socialist 
bloc were restricted. In East Asia the People’s Republic of China was the main 
adversary. Bilateral security ties were established between the United States and 
non-communist ‘Pacific Rim’ countries surrounding China from the late 1940s 
onwards, with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, South Vietnam and Thailand as the 
main regional allies. 
 
The US allied governments benefited from large amounts of economic and military 
aid, military procurement during the wars in Korea and Vietnam and relatively 
favorable conditions for export to the United States, while regional contacts were 
limited. Japan was soon ‘graduated’ from US aid. Yet it relied heavily on US 
military procurement during the Korean War and later on US export markets for its 
economic reconstruction. Eventually US authorities stepped up their efforts to 
integrate Japan into the Western world economy. In 1955 Japan with the backing of 
the United States became a member of GATT despite strong resistance from 
Britain. This allowed the well-organized Japanese exporters led by the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) to take advantage of the international trade 
boom from the late 1950s and expand their export to the West (Borden 1984: 186-
190). 
 
From the mid-to-late 1960s South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore (the 
EANICs) also initiated export-promoting industrialization strategies. The 
developed countries in the West, especially the United States, served as the main 
markets of manufacturing exports from Japan and the EANICs. Still, the United 
States also sought to promote diplomatic reconciliation and trade and foreign 
investment links between Japan and her non-communist neighbors as part of its 
containment policy. The pre-1945 Japanese economy had relied on extensive trade 
and investment relations with the colonial empire in Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria 
as well as with other parts of East Asia. These relations declined after Japan’s 
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defeat in World War II. Japan had to import from the United States a number of the 
raw materials that it earlier had drawn from the region, but lacked the dollar 
incomes necessary to pay for this. The country thus needed US aid. In order to 
solve these problems, US authorities on various occasions sought to renew Japan’s 
trade with South Korea, Taiwan, China and Southeast Asia in order to strengthen 
the Japanese economy. After the Chinese involvement in the Korean War in 
November 1950 the option of establishing economic ties between Japan and China 
was closed. The United States established an embargo on China and focused on 
renewing economic ties between Japan and non-communist East Asian countries 
(McGlothlen 1993). 
 
Rather than economic integration, the 1950s established the political foundation for 
regional economic integration, most notably through the 1951 San Francisco Peace 
Accord with Japan. The region was characterized by economic and geopolitical 
bilateralism, with the United States at the core as the source of military protection, 
aid and export markets. The United States controlled the foreign policy of its allies 
and established a network of US bases and military personnel in the region outside 
of the control of the host governments.  
 
In the 1960s there were renewed efforts to accomplish non-communist regional 
integration. The main motive was to promote economic growth in order to contain 
communism in Southeast Asia with Japan as the locomotive.2 This led to a series of 
piecemeal actions to improve bilateral relations between Japan and East Asian 
nations in the early 1960s. During the second half of the decade the United States 
co-operated with Japan to launch a more concerted multilateral effort at non-
communist East Asian integration through the Asian Development Bank (Woo 
1991: 91).  
 
Helped by US support Japan’s regional economic power expanded through foreign 
aid and foreign investment, although at a tortuous pace during the 1950s and 1960s. 
Large-scale Japanese FDI in manufacturing and resource extraction in East- and 
Southeast Asia resumed in the late 1960s when the government lifted its 
                                                          
2 This was not just a continuation of the late 1940s US policy of finding an economic hinterland 
to Japan. Japan had recovered and was doing well in trade with Western countries. Now the idea 
was to use Japan to pull Southeast Asian countries away from communism, and to limit Japan’s 
interest in increased economic interaction with the China mainland. The Americans envisioned 
that Japan increasingly would cover development aid in East Asia, while the United States 
specialized in security assistance. See ‘Department of State Policy on the Future of Japan’, June 
26, 1964, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security Files, box 250, doc. 70. 
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restrictions on foreign investment, increased throughout the 1970s and then 
stabilized during the first half of the 1980s before it boomed from the late 1980s.  
The European contrast  
The United States was instrumental in promoting Japanese-led regional economic 
integration during the Cold War. Yet the emergent state system of US Cold War 
allies was not favorable to strong political integration. A comparison with Europe 
may clarify this point:  
 
European integration started in the 1950s, where the quest for Franco-German 
conciliation and integration became the core of a project to create economic union 
between the countries of ‘little Europe’. Common norms of collective identity were 
stronger in ‘little Europe’ than in East Asia based on a commitment to liberal 
democracy. Later Spain, Portugal and Greece came under strong pressure to 
conform to these norms in order to become EU members. In contrast non-
communist East Asia comprised of a wide variety of forms of rule, including 
monarchies, military dictatorships, personalized rule, democracies and single-party 
rule with limited possibilities for common identities (Katzenstein and Shiraishi 
1997: 366).  
 
The United States supported the gradual integration project of Europe. The Western 
European countries were at similar levels of development. France (and the other 
non-German EU states) related to Germany from a position of political strength. 
The division of Germany reduced the power capabilities of West Germany to the 
level of the other major European powers. The EU-institutions were designed so 
that West Germany would be controlled, its growing wealth also benefiting the 
other core countries.  
 
In contrast, in East Asia, a new state system emerged from the decolonization 
process. There was never a realistic vision of a broad federation of US allies, which 
naturally would have been dominated by the old aggressor Japan. Undivided Japan 
was the only large partner to the United States and the only industrialized country 
in the region. The economic strength of Japan in per capita terms and even more so 
in absolute terms was a major impediment to regional political integration. Within 
this setting US regional geopolitical dominance through a series of bilateral ties 
with a disarmed Japan as the key ally became the preferred option to restrain Japan. 
This was also accepted within Japan itself as the country settled for a low-key 
diplomatic strategy, focusing on economic relations (Mjøset and Nordhaug 1999). 
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Transformation of the regional state system  
The regional Cold War order began to dissolve from the early 1970s with the 
rapprochement between the United States and China and the US disengagement 
from Indochina. US aid to regional allies now dried out. Détente along with market 
economic reforms in China (from the end of the 1970s) and Vietnam (from the 
early 1980s) allowed for the integration of these socialist countries into the regional 
trade and investment system. From the 1970s the United States was pursuing a 
tough trade policy against Japan, and in the 1980s also against Taiwan and South 
Korea. Still the United States remained the region’s single largest export market 
and the US trade deficit with the region was expanding in the 1980s.  
 
In Southeast Asia a process of political integration took place with ASEAN as the 
key player. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand 
established ASEAN in 1967. It was designed as a regional conflict management 
regime for negotiating disputes that had flared between the member states during 
1965-67. ASEAN was later extended to include Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), 
Myanmar (1997), Laos (1997) and Cambodia (1999).  
 
Common problems in the history of ASEAN strengthened its unity. During the 
early years ASEAN was loosely tied together by an anticommunist commitment, 
countering Chinese support to local revolutionary groups. From the mid-1970s the 
new socialist People’s Republic of Vietnam became the main enemy, while the end 
of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the Sino-American détente, and the Sino-
Vietnamese conflict after the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia in 1978 helped 
to improve relations with China in the 1980s (Frost 1990: 6-13). Then came a 
temporary decline in relations with China when the territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea intensified in the early-to-mid 1990s. This helped to improve relations 
with Vietnam that was included into ASEAN as a counterweight to China in 1995 
(Castro 1998: 97-101).  
 
In the 1990s ASEAN promoted region-wide dialogue on security issues through the 
ASEAN Regional Forum. An ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) to reduce tariffs 
and ease restrictions on foreign investment over a 15 years period came into effect 
in 1993 (later the deadline was changed from 2008 to 2003). Still, intra-ASEAN 
trade has been limited. During the high-growth period 1990-97 there was only a 
modest increase in intra-ASEAN export as a proportion of total ASEAN export 
from 18.9 to 23.6 percent, and a significant part of this trade consisted of raw 
materials that were not legible for liberalization. By comparison the export of the 
original ASEAN countries Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and 
Thailand to non-ASEAN Asian countries (mostly in East Asia) amounted to 35.1 
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percent of their total export in 1997.  
 
‘The ASEAN way’ of co-operation may to some extent explain the limited 
accomplishments of ASEAN economic integration. The postcolonial setting of the 
ASEAN countries (excepting Thailand) has helped to fashion a strong common 
concern with national sovereignty that has been institutionalized in the 
organization. The binding power of ASEAN over its member states is limited as 
decisions are based on consensus. Reflecting concern about national sovereignty, 
ASEAN member states have not been willing to vest strong power in a central 
secretariat. Most administrative work is done by ASEAN secretariats housed in the 
foreign ministries of each member state (Stubbs 2000: 314).  
 
AFTA has been marred by exceptions and non-tariff trade barriers. More 
fundamentally, it has only accomplished ‘shallow economic integration’. ASEAN 
has shied away from harmonization of trade, investment policies or macroeconomic 
integration. Concern about sovereignty has probably been reinforced by structural 
economic relations among the ASEAN countries. The lack of complementary 
economic relations within ASEAN-4 in terms of export production and export 
markets and their ensuing competitive relations impede deep integration (Schmidt 
2002).3 
 
A process of regional political integration has then been progressing at a moderate 
pace in Southeast Asia, bridging previous Cold War divisions. In contrast, in 
Northeast Asia divisions related to the region’s civil wars and the Cold War 
continued with hostilities between China and Taiwan and the two Koreas and the 
stationing of some 80,000 US troops in South Korea and Japan.4  
 
It was previously noted that differences in level of economic strength between 
Japan and the other US East Asian allies precluded regional integration along 
European lines. With the turn to détente in the 1970s and strong economic growth 
in China in the 1980s this situation appeared to change. China – albeit still a very 
poor country in per capita terms – has developed into a formidable regional 
                                                          
3 East Asia appears to be dominated by a ’Ricardian’ regional division of labour, where economic 
integration is strongest among countries with differing levels of economic development and 
complementary economic specialization. This is a major difference from EU economic 
integration with considerable intra-branch trade between countries with relatively similar levels 
of economic development.  
4 In contrast, the major US military stronghold in Southeast Asia, the Subic Bay naval base in the 
Philippines was closed in 1992 and turned into civilian use. 
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economic power. Yet there have been few indications of conciliation between 
China and Japan. A deep Chinese distrust against Japan remained. This distrust was 
reinforced by the Japanese unwillingness to admit war crimes, an outcome of the 
strategically important position of the nationalist rightwing within Japan’s ruling 
Liberal-Democratic Party. As long as this situation continues, ‘the rise of China’ is 
likely to promote sharpened regional rivalry between the two major East Asian 
powers, rather than anything resembling the Franco–German axis.  
 
Furthermore, Japan has been reluctant to end its special security relationship with 
the United States. On the contrary, Japanese authorities have willingly ceded to US 
demands for military ‘burden-sharing’, possibly in order to win US acceptance of 
large Japanese trade surpluses and protectionist barriers. Japan is now subsidizing 
the US naval base in Okinawa, the key US military stronghold in East Asia. In that 
way the US–Japanese Cold War alliance has been preserved in the post-Cold War 
setting (Johnson 2001; Okazaki 2000).  
 
Thus, Northeast Asian divisions and Japanese reliance on the United States both 
seem to be major obstacles to formalized regional political integration in East Asia. 
Still, East Asian regional economic integration is primarily driven from Northeast 
Asia through investment and investment-related trade. There are strong economic 
ties between Northeast and Southeast Asia, as well as within the ‘Greater China’ 
area of China, Hong Kong and the southeast provinces of China. On the other hand, 
economic ties among ASEAN members are fairly modest despite of a relatively 
developed regional political framework.  
 
There is then a ‘mismatch’ in terms of regional political and economic integration. 
A relatively strong degree of political integration in Southeast Asia is not matched 
by a corresponding degree of economic integration. Conversely, relatively strong 
economic integration in Northeast Asia and between Northeast and Southeast Asia 
do not go along with an encompassing political framework. Regional economic 
integration has mainly takes place ‘from below’ through trade and investment. 
Integration is strongest between generations of East Asian industrializers with 
differing levels of economic development. Trade between these countries is to a 
large extent generated by foreign direct investment (FDI).  
 
Economic integration is smoothened through a number of informal social and 
political arrangements, rather than through formal diplomacy. There are informal 
bilateral political contacts as seen in Japan’s and Taiwan’s foreign aid diplomacy, 
ethnic-based predominantly non-state networks and sub-regional arrangements as 
seen in the links between Singapore, Johore (Malaysia) and Riau (Indonesia) as 
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well as the ‘Greater China area’ of Taiwan, Hong Kong and China’s Guangdong 
and Fujian provinces. 
 
Let us now take a closer look at the process of East Asian regional economic 
integration, its accomplishments and limitations. 
 
2. East Asian economic integration 1985-97 
US seigniorage and East Asia  
‘The East Asian miracle’ of the past two decades has been based on successful 
adjustment to US seigniorage. Seigniorage refers to advantages of controlling the 
world economy’s reserve currency. In the post-Bretton Woods setting of the 1980s 
the Reagan administration learned that the United States did not face the same 
constraint as other countries to earn foreign exchange to pay for its import and 
foreign investment since most of its foreign trade was conducted in dollar. It could 
therefore endure huge current account deficits. The US current account deficit 
during 1975-79 had been 7.4 billion US$. It increased to 146.5 billion in 1980-84, 
660.6 billion in 1985-89, decreased to 324.4 billion during 1990-94, before it 
escalated to 990.4 billion during 1995-99 (Arrighi 2002: 22).  
 
As shown by Giovanni Arrighi (2002) this led to a bifurcation of Third World 
growth trajectories. US competition for international capital funds and the ensuing 
international interest rate hike unleashed the Third World debt crisis with severe 
economic setbacks in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. East Asian countries 
mostly had a lower level of debt than the countries of Latin America and Africa and 
were in a better position to take advantage of booming US export markets.5 Table 1 
shows the East Asian ability to take advantage of growing US imports and trade 
deficits during the period 1985-2001. 
 
US–Japanese relations  
During the 1980s escalating US current account deficits went along with large 
federal deficits. The US Treasury Department (‘US Treasury’) financed the federal 
debt through the sale of Treasury securities (bills, notes and bonds, or simply 
‘Treasuries’). US hegemony was transformed from being based on manufacturing 
strength to a new financial power base thanks to its ability to attract capital funds 
from the rest of the world and reinvest them. Large-scale foreign purchases of long-
                                                          
5 In his comparison of East Asia and Africa Arrighi (2002: 26-29) emphasizes East Asian 
advantages in terms of large regional labour supplies and indigenous entrepreneurship based on 
the overseas Chinese diasporas. 
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term Treasury Bonds helped to hold down the long-term US interest rate.6 The 
initial realization of these potentials of US seigniorage relied on a symbiotic 
relationship with Japan from the early 1980s onwards. 
 
 
Table 1: US trade balance with select Asian countries 1985-2001 (billion US$)
  1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 200-01
Japan -258.4 -259.1 -300.2 -150.6
 EANICs 
S. Korea -34.5 -11.6 -8.6 -25.5
Taiwan -68.7 -48.9 -64.4 -31.4
Hong Kong -25.3 -2.6 17.4 7.5
Singapore -8.1 -8.1 -13.8 1.3
Sum EANICs -136.7 -71.1 -69.5 -48.0
 ASEAN-4 
Indonesia -13.1 -10.9 -27.5 -15.5
Malaysia -5.9 -19.5 -47.6 -27.6
Philippines -3.7 -6.9 -17.1 -8.8
Thailand -5.4 -18.4 -31.6 -18.5
Sum ASEAN-4 -28.1 -55.8 -123.8 -70.5
China -14.2 -93.7 -248.6 -166.9
Sum Asian countries -437.4 -479.7 -742.2 -436.0
Trade deficit with 
select Asian 
countries as % of 
total US deficit 
n.d. 92.4 69.5 51.4
Source: Tabulated from U.S. Census Bureau 2002. 
 
 
Large proportions of Japan’s dollar current account surplus that mainly derived 
from its trade with the United States were invested in the United States, especially 
in the purchase of US Treasuries. ‘Reaganomics’ relied on Japanese capitalism to 
become viable (Murphy 1996). Also the Chinese (Chinese-dominated) states (semi-
states) China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore built up large central bank 
reserves that they mostly invested in US Treasuries. 
 
                                                          
6 Eventually, the US manufacturing sector regained much of its previous industrial strength in the 
1990s after a tough restructuring process in the 1980s, while the Clinton administration 
succeeded in balancing the budget. As for the geopolitical side of US hegemony, seigniorage 
allowed the Reagan administration to finance an arms race through massive deficit spending that 
broke the spine of the Soviet Union.  
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Persistent trade deficits in the United States and trade surpluses in Japan created an 
upward pressure on the yen exchange rate relatively to the dollar during 1985-95. 
This started in September 1985 when a meeting of finance ministers and central 
bank directors of the G-5 (United States, Japan, West Germany, France and United 
Kingdom) at the Plaza Hotel in New York agreed on concerted central bank 
intervention to bring down the dollar to a more competitive level. The initial rise of 
the yen was reinforced by the growing Japanese trade surpluses with the United 
States. A steep rise of the yen followed from 260 to one dollar in March 1985 to 
120 in 1988 (Funabashi 1989: 261-266).  
 
The Japanese real estate and stock market crash in the early 1990s led to a new 
round of appreciation of the yen as liquidity-strapped Japanese investors sold off 
assets in the United States to hurry the money back home to Japan. In result, yen 
demand increased and dollar demand decreased, pushing up the yen exchange rate 
further (Murphy 1996: 272). Also, during 1993-95 the Clinton administration 
attempted to pursue a tough trade policy along with efforts at ‘talking down the 
dollar’. These US policies reinforced the effect of Japanese sales of dollar-
denominated assets and reduced Japanese investment in the United States (Murphy 
1996: 286-287). The yen exchange rate rose from 125 to one dollar in January 1993 
to about 80 in March/April 1995. Thus the dollar exchange rate of the yen more 
than tripled during 1985-95.  
 
In early 1995 the Treasury became worried about a slow-down of Japanese 
investments in Treasury Securities and possibly also hints from Japan’s Ministry of 
Finance about the prospects of a major withdrawal of Japanese investments in US 
long-term Treasury Bonds. The latter would have led to a strong rise of US long-
term interest rates. There was also concern about the inflationary impact of the 
weak dollar. From 1995 Treasury assumed control over US trade policies and 
economic relations with Japan and the ministries of finance and central banks of the 
two sides began to co-operate in order to strengthen the dollar relatively to the yen 
(Nordhaug 2001: 69-70; Nordhaug 2002).  
 
Foreign direct investment  
Japan’s East Asian neighbors, especially Southeast Asia and China, benefited from 
the appreciation of the yen during 1985-95. There was a strong correlation between 
the yen exchange rate and Japanese FDI in Asia (with a due time lag from 
exchange rate changes to investment decisions). Periods with yen appreciation 
relatively to the dollar were followed by a strong growth of Japanese FDI, and 
conversely investment growth declined when the yen depreciated (Kwan 2001: 40). 
Thus, the strong yen of 1985-95 led to expanding Japanese FDI in East Asia. 
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Major Japanese companies responded to declining competitiveness by relocating 
core manufacturing export production to Japan’s East Asian neighbors. Japanese 
annual FDI in manufacturing in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, China, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines had been a 
little above US$ 600 million per year during 1981-6. It increased to US$ 2,370 
million in 1987 (Pempel 1997 60).7 In 1995 Japan’s manufacturing direct 
investment in ‘Asia’ (mainly East Asia) stood at US$ 8.1 billion.  
 
Soon after the 1985 Plaza Agreement also South Korea and Taiwan faced US trade 
policy pressure to appreciate their currencies. Rising domestic wage levels and land 
prices undermined their competitiveness further within low-skill activities. In 1988 
the US Congress ‘graduated’ Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea 
from its Generalized System of Trade Preferences. Also it labeled Japan an ‘unfair 
trade’ under its ‘Super 301’ Trade Act, while Taiwan and South Korea escaped 
only due to trade opening on their part (Schmidt 2002). Thus, there was a 
worsening of the competitive position of Northeast Asia that coincided with 
devaluation and policy packages to promote export and foreign investment in 
Southeast Asia and China. Japanese investors in Southeast Asia were soon 
followed by investors from South Korea and Taiwan, contributing to growing 
economic integration between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia and an economic 
boom in Southeast Asia from the late 1980s. Companies from Taiwan and Hong 
Kong were also investing heavily in Mainland China.  
 
The Japanese foreign investment offensive in East Asia has been based on close co-
operation between the Japanese government and major Japanese companies. A 
much more loose and diffuse type of networking with limited state-involvement 
evolved between ethnic Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan, the southern coastal 
provinces of China and Southeast Asia. For a long period of time overseas Chinese 
had developed ethnic networks based on speech group and ancestral descent. Some 
of these networks spanned over several countries in the Southeast Asian region. 
This allowed for swift dissemination of information, mobilization of cheap credits 
and movements of capital into new enterprises and geographical areas, access to 
labor from fellow underclass kinsmen and market outlets. The high mobility of 
capital within and across borders and the ethnic exclusiveness of economic 
interaction protected against confiscation by governments (Lim 1983: 3-4, 6; 
McVey 1992: 20-21). 
                                                          
7 These and the following figures underestimate the real investment level, as they do not include 
reinvestment of the affiliates’ profit locally. 
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With the Chinese economic reforms of the 1980s overseas Chinese networks were 
strengthened between the Chinese states/semi-states Hong Kong, Taiwan and the 
China mainland. The Chinese government offered various incentives to attract 
foreign capital and know-how to export-oriented joint ventures with national actors, 
primarily state-owned enterprises, from the early 1980s. US and Japanese foreign 
investors remained cautious due to Chinese red tape, employment protection, poor 
quality and irregular supplies of raw materials and currency restrictions. However, 
overseas Chinese from Hong Kong and Taiwan were swiftly able to benefit from 
the Chinese opening (despite security-related discouragement and restrictions by 
the Taiwan government in the latter case). They were encouraged to invest in the 
China mainland by special inducements as part of Beijing’s reunification policy of 
strengthening economic ties with Hong Kong and Taiwan. Thanks to their 
familiarity with local culture, language and manipulation of kinship and community 
ties, overseas Chinese foreign investors were also able to bypass regulations that 
hampered other foreign investors. When Japanese investment expanded in the 
Chinese mainland in the 1990s, overseas Chinese investors had already established 
a strong competitive position (So and Chiu 1994: 243-248). 
 
Chinese business networks did also play a strong role in Southeast Asia. A three-
tiered pattern of trade had emerged in most of Southeast Asia during the colonial 
period. The Europeans dominated the upper tier; Chinese occupied the middle tier; 
while the indigenous population was restricted to petty trade. These Chinese traders 
were able to move into economic positions that earlier had been held by the 
colonizers after de-colonization (McVey 1992: 20).8 
 
Southeast Asian Chinese business was strengthened by the growing investment in 
the region from the late 1980s by Taiwanese and other overseas Chinese who had a 
strong preference for local Chinese partners. While Japanese investors frequently 
brought along their domestic supplier networks as they moved abroad, Chinese 
investors were more willing to co-operate with local Chinese suppliers (Jomo et al. 
1997: 49). 
 
The United States and other Western OECD countries were the main targets of the 
export of finished goods resulting from the build-up of regional manufacturing 
capacity through FDI from Japan and the EANICs. Relocation of export production 
helped the Northeast Asian countries to dispel some of the trade policy tension with 
                                                          
8 Similarly, in independent Thailand the removal of Europeans during World War II allowed 
Chinese to take over local banking. 
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the United States. As seen from table 1 Japan’s trade surplus with the United States 
has been relatively stable after the late 1980s, while the surplus of the EANICs has 
declined. This went along with a strong increase in the surplus of the ASEAN-4 
and China which received large investment from Japan and the NIEAs into their 
export manufacturing.  
 
Investments from Japan and the EANICs have stimulated increasingly dense intra-
regional trade in manufacturing inputs. However, Japanese companies normally 
declined to move production for Japanese markets abroad, only their production for 
regional markets and for export to third countries. Thus, export of finished 
manufactured goods from East Asia to Japan was depressed, while the region’s 
imports of key inputs from the Japanese workshop increased. In result, regional 
trade deficits with Japan tended to grow, unless manufacturing trade deficits were 
compensated by exports of important raw materials to Japan. The East Asian 
countries then had to rely on trade surpluses earned with countries outside the 
region, especially with the United States, to cover their trade deficits with Japan 
(Bernard & Ravenhill 1995; Hatch & Yamamura 1996: ch. 10).9  
 
The East Asian dollar bloc 
Japan’s strong position within regional producer networks was not matched by 
monetary strength. The yen has played a modest role in transactions outside the 
Japanese border as indicated by low and declining levels of international holdings 
of the yen, yen-denominated international bond issues and foreign exchange and 
trade transactions in the 1990s. Most of Japan’s foreign trade has been paid in 
dollar, rather than yen, not only in its trade with the United States, but also with 
third countries, and most of the foreign lending by Japanese financial institutions 
has been dollar-denominated (Castellano 1999: 2-4; CFEOT 1999: appendices I.1-
8). 
 
East Asia was a dollar bloc, rather than a yen bloc, where most foreign trade and 
investment were conducted in dollar. Excepting Japan, most regional currencies 
were linked to the dollar from the mid-1980s until the 1997 regional currency crisis 
(including the currencies of China and Vietnam in the early-to-mid 1990s).10 This 
                                                          
9 China has however broken this pattern and is running trade surpluses with Japan as well as with 
the United States. Yet it is running a large trade deficit with Taiwan through indirect trade that 
mainly appears in the form of Hong Kong’s large trade deficit with Taiwan. 
10 Except from the Hong Kong dollar, nominal exchange rates of regional currencies were not 
pegged to the dollar. However, until the 1997 currency crisis most East Asian currencies were 
closely pegged to the US dollar in terms of consumer-price deflated real exchange rates. See 
McKinnon (2000: 38-40).  
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also meant that the currencies were loosely tied to one another. These arrangements 
protected against competitive devaluation and helped the countries to stabilize 
domestic price levels, while yen appreciation enhanced the region’s 
competitiveness relatively to Japan and encouraged the inflow of Japanese 
investment (Sum 2002: 58; McKinnon 2000).  
 
Despite of the unbalanced trade with Japan, there was a favorable and stable 
relationship between the Japan-led regional–national production order financed by 
export-oriented FDI and a monetary-financial order where regional currencies were 
linked to an American-dominated dollar-bloc regime and linked with a yen-
appreciating bubble in the period 1985-95. Yet these two orders were also 
vulnerable to crises (Sum 2002).  
 
East Asian models of accumulation and their destabilization  
With the exception of the Philippines and partially also Taiwan, the EANICs, the 
ASEAN-4 and China, have had high rates of saving and investment as shown in 
table 2.11 This may be viewed as a necessity of late industrialization. Excepting 
Japan, the countries were competing within export markets with low barriers to 
entry, while they were attempting to undertake industrial upgrading to conquer 
niche markets and move into high-profit yielding export markets.12 Low profits and 
fast manufacturing expansion with industrial upgrading required large volumes of 
investment and credit (Sum 2002: 58). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Wade and Venoroso (1998a) refer to an East Asian high-debt model characterized by high rates 
of saving and investment and banking systems that pool household savings to highly debt-
leveraged companies overseen by governments that actively intervene in the financial systems 
and control the capital account. The Asian financial crisis is explained as a result of the 
destabilization of this order through financial liberalization. This model is far too generalizing as 
there are great regional variations in household saving, corporate debt-to-equity ratios, system of 
financial intermediation (banks or capital markets) and government intervention in the credit 
system. 
12 The NIEAs have come close to the stage of transition into high-profit yielding activities over 
the past decade, while the economies of Southeast Asia and China still are dominated by low-
profit-low-barriers-to-entry export production. See Kaplinsky (1999) who argues that among the 
NIEAs Taiwan and Singapore are closest to a successful transition, while Korea and Hong Kong 
are more dubious.  
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Table 2: Saving, investment and GDP growth in select Asian countries 1981-
95 (%-rates) 
  Average19
81-90 1991 1992
 
1993 
 
1994 1995
NIEAs 
Hong Kong 
  
Saving  
Investment  
GDP growth 
33.5
27.2
6.9
33.8
27.2
5.1
33.8
28.5
6.3
34.6 
27.6 
6.4 
33.9 
31.8 
5.4 
34.5
33.1
4.6
South Korea  Saving  
Investment  
GDP growth 
32.4
30.6
12.7
36.4
38.9
9.1
35.2
36.6
5.1
35.4 
35.1 
5.8 
35.5 
35.9 
8.4 
37.0
36.0
9.2
Singapore 
  
Saving  
Investment  
GDP growth 
41.8
41.7
6.5
44.0
35.1
6.7
45.6
36.0
6.3
46.3 
37.7 
10.1 
51.3 
32.2 
10.1 
55.6
33.9
8.9
Taiwan  
  
Saving  
Investment  
GDP growth 
32.9
22.8
8.0
27.8
23.3
7.6
27.0
24.9
6.8
27.0 
25.2 
6.3 
25.8 
23.9 
6.5 
26.3
24.5
6.3
Country 
average  
Saving  
Investment  
GDP growth 
35.2
30.6
8.5
35.5
31.4
7.1
35.2
31.5
6.1
35.7 
30.9 
6.3 
36.6 
31.0 
7.6 
38.4
33.4
7.3
ASEAN-4 
Thailand  
  
Saving  
Investment  
GDP growth 
26.2
30.7
7.9
27.2
42.7
8.5
35.2
40.0
8.1
35.6 
39.9 
8.8 
35.2 
41.0 
8.7 
34.2
40.0
8.6
Malaysia  
  
Saving  
Investment  
GDP growth 
33.2
30.6
5.2
32.0
35.8
8.6
36.5
35.1
7.8
37.7 
37.8 
8.3 
37.6 
38.7 
9.2 
37.2
40.6
9.3
Indonesia  
  
Saving  
Investment  
GDP growth 
30.9
29.3
6.0
33.5
32.0
8.9
35.3
32.4
7.2
32.5 
29.5 
7.3 
35.3 
34.0 
7.5 
36.0
38.3
7.6
Philippines  
  
Saving  
Investment  
GDP growth 
22.2
22.0
1.0
16.6
20.2
-0.6
17.0
20.8
0.3
15.2 
23.6 
2.1 
14.9 
23.5 
4.4 
14.7
21.6
4.8
Country 
average 
  
Saving  
Investment  
GDP growth 
28.1
28.2
5.0
27.3
32.7
6.4
31.0
32.1
5.9
30.3 
32.7 
6.6 
30.8 
34.3 
7.5 
30.5
35.4
7.6
China 
  
Saving  
Investment  
GDP growth 
30.8
30.5
10.4
38.1
35.4
9.3
38.3
37.3
14.2
41.5 
43.5 
13.5 
41.4 
40.0 
11.8 
42.2
39.5
10.2
Source: ADB 1996/1997: tables A1, A7, A8. 
 
The high investment levels increased the risk of over-investment for export markets 
that would depress export prices and profitability. There were limited possibilities 
to respond to declining prices in finished goods export markets outside the region 
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with production for national and regional markets, as the mirror image of the 
region’s high saving and investment rates was low consumption rates. During the 
1990s high regional rates of corporate investment went along with declining rates 
of return in most of the NIEAs and ASEAN-4 countries. There were also 
spectacular cases of over-investment, such as South Korea’s expansion in Dynamic 
Random Memory chips (DRAMs) that caused a 90 percent plunge in world market 
prices in 1996. An alternative strategy was to divert more investment into securities 
and real estate. That frequently led to new second-order over-investment problems 
as seen in the bursting of Bangkok’s real estate bubble in 1996 (Sum 2002: 59, 61-
62). 
 
The regional financial order and monetary regime reinforced tendencies of 
overproduction and over-investment with lowered investment quality. On the 
supply side financial inflows in the 1990s were enhanced by the renewed inflow of 
First World financial capital into the Third World after the debt crisis of the 1980s 
and by the bursting of the Japanese bubble. Japan’s ensuing economic stagnation 
and loose post-bubble monetary policies from 1992 with low interest rates created 
surplus liquidity which ‘leaked out’ to East Asia. Japan dominated foreign direct 
investment and lending to East Asia, while most of the foreign portfolio investment 
to the region came from the United States and Europe. Yet much of the funding of 
the portfolio investments initially came from Japan. International investors engaged 
in the so-called yen carry trade through borrowing at low interest rates in Japan, 
exchanging yen into dollar and re-investing throughout the world, including East 
Asia (Bevacqua 1998: p. 414-415). Most East Asian countries (with exceptions 
such as China and Taiwan) liberalized their capital accounts to attract these funds 
from the early 1990s. 
 
As seen from table 2 the investment rates of ASEAN-4 were generally higher than 
their saving rates. This saving–investment gap was covered by capital inflows. In 
the early 1990s some of these countries had experienced a decline of FDI inflows, 
to a large extent because of the growing competition from China. They responded 
with capital account liberalization in order to attract financial flows. The 
combination of capital account deregulation, strong growth, monetary stability with 
de facto dollar pegs, high local interest rates and or/lucrative markets in securities 
and real estate encouraged large inflows of loans (frequently short term) and 
portfolio investment. With these volatile forms of capital and the build up of 
foreign debt the countries became increasingly reliant on investor confidence, and 
the maintenance of their dollar peg.  
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Net private foreign investment in South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and 
the Philippines increased from US$ 40.5 billion in 1994 to 93.0 billion in 1996 
(Radelet & Sachs 1998: appendix, table 1). As these inflows of foreign capital were 
exchanged for domestic currencies, the resulting demand wielded an upward 
pressure on local currency exchange rates and created an inflationary pressure. The 
growth of money supply exceeded GDP growth. This resulted in excess liquidity, 
which fuelled an extremely high level of investment. In result there was a rise in 
the level of ‘bad investment’: various kinds of asset speculation and investment in 
industrial over-capacity (Bevacqua 1998: 416; Wade 2000: 102). 
East Asian foreign debt soared as a result of the inflow of loans. Large proportions 
of these loans were short-term (one year maturity or less) which were used to 
finance long-term investment, and renewed on a regular base. Much of the lending 
was not hedged against exchange rate changes and growing foreign debt 
complicated the option a ‘soft landing’ by abandoning the monetary pegs. In 
Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea – which all would receive ‘rescue packages’ 
from the IMF – short-term debt exceeded foreign reserves, and grew at a faster 
pace than these reserves (Radelet & Sachs 1998: appendix, table 3). Economic 
stability then relied on the willingness of foreign lenders to renew short-term loans.  
 
The region was also adversely affected by the depreciation of the yen following the 
1995 ‘reverse Plaza agreement’. The declining yen affected regional 
competitiveness within higher end East Asian manufacturing directly involved in 
competition with Japanese products, especially in South Korea and reduced the 
growth in Japanese foreign investment (Kwan 2001: 41-43). The ‘rise of China’ 
weakened the competitiveness of ASEAN-4 within lower-end manufacturing. 
Chinese exports were boosted by devaluations in 1990 and 1994, wages were lower 
than in Thailand and Malaysia, while the skills and level of education of the 
Chinese labor force frequently were better than in ASEAN-4. ASEAN-4 exports 
were increasingly compressed to a narrow range of electronic products leading to 
enhanced economic vulnerability (Lo 1999; Hughes 2000: 238-240, table 4). 
 
Declining export growth and growing current account deficits probably weakened 
foreign investor confidence in regional assets and currencies, and the countries 
were becoming increasingly vulnerable to sudden capital outflows. Eventually 
investors began to sell away Southeast Asian currencies during May and June 1997 
and a number of major Thai financial institutions failed. By July 2 the Bank of 
Thailand was forced to float the baht. This was followed by regional contamination 
in Southeast Asia. Foreign lenders refused to renew loans falling due. Large-scale 
dumping of assets and currencies pushed down their values. The Philippines, 
Malaysia and Indonesia were forced to abandon their currency pegs in July and 
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August. In the next round attention shifted to Taiwan, leading to a moderate 
depreciation of the NT dollar in October 1997, while the Korean won was floated 
in late November. 
 
A US$ 93.0 billion net inflow of private capital to South Korea, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines in 1996 changed to a US$ 12.1 billion net 
outflow in 1997 (Radelet & Sachs 1998: appendix, table 1). The countries were 
now caught in vicious circles of currency depreciation, increased foreign debt and 
collapse of domestic financial institutions and had to go to the IMF to ask for 
emergency credits. Stand-by agreements were signed by Thailand (5 August), 
Indonesia (31 October) and South Korea (4 December), while the Philippines 
extended a previous IMF agreement. 
 
Regional economic integration and impediments to monetary integration  
Let us now try to relate the previous discussion of East Asian regional integration 
and development models during 1985-97 to the question of regional monetary co-
operation. It has been pointed out that East Asia’s export boom to a large extent has 
been based on successful adjustment to US monetary seigniorage. This has been 
based on the region’s ability to take advantage of the strong growth of US imports 
closely related to the US dollar hegemony. US seigniorage was underwritten 
further by the use of the dollar in trade and investment relations with third parties, 
by the tying of regional currencies to the dollar and by reinvesting regional dollar 
reserves (directly or indirectly deriving from US current account deficits) in US 
Treasuries. Stated differently, US seigniorage allowed for a complementary 
relationship between US over-consumption and East Asian under-consumption. 
Much of the dollars earned by the high-saving, high-investing East Asian countries 
in their trade with the United States were reinvested in US Treasuries and other US 
securities, thus sustaining the investment rate of the high-consuming, low-saving 
United States.  
 
The regional adjustment to a dollar standard and Japan’s interest in holding down 
the yen exchange rate were major impediments to monetary regionalization, which 
naturally would have been based on the yen. Also, monetary arrangements which 
involved the pooling of central bank reserves were impeded by the practice of 
investing these reserves in US Treasuries, and Japan’s interest in using its Treasury 
holdings as a lever in its bargaining with the United States.  
 
However, the Asian financial crisis demonstrated some of the financial and 
monetary vulnerabilities of regional development models. This can be seen as a 
dilemma of late development: There is a strong imperative to maintain high levels 
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of investment, but that can easily lead to economic overheating and a lowering of 
investment quality. This becomes all the more dangerous when countries liberalize 
their capital accounts to attract volatile financial funds. These tendencies could 
possibly be contained or dampened by effective regional monetary co-operation.  
 
3. East Asian monetary integration efforts 
AMF v. IMF  
The IMF required the closing of financial institutions, the enforcement of strict 
regulatory standards and liberalization of the financial system and the capital 
account in return for emergency funds. At best these policies had little relevance in 
stemming the crisis. At worst they enhanced investor panic. The most serious case 
was the abrupt closing of sixteen commercial banks in Indonesia during autumn 
1997, which caused a run, also on healthy banks. The IMF was also demanding 
policies of fiscal contraction and discount rate increase in a failed attempt to 
stabilize East Asian currencies. These pro-cyclical policies had a serious effect on 
regional markets and starved local business of credits. Zealous demands for budget 
surpluses, which the countries failed to meet and high interest rates that expanded 
the domestic debt weakened the foreign investors’ confidence. The IMF attempted 
to act as an international lender of last resort, rather than mediating in the 
rescheduling of debt payment, as it had done in the Latin American crisis of the 
1980s. Yet it failed to deliver on its promise. Emergency funds were sliced in 
tranches to be disbursed over the program period, pending adjustment performance. 
These tranches were too small compared to the debt falling due to stem the panic, 
and disbursement was delayed by drawn-out complicated negotiations (Radelet & 
Sachs 1998: 34-37). 
 
Disillusioned by the IMF’s poor performance in Thailand and the US unwillingness 
to contribute to the bailout fund for Thailand, the ASEAN countries in August 1997 
officially proposed a permanent regional Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) financed by 
the East Asian countries. The real driving force in this initiative was Japan’s 
Ministry of Finance.13 The AMF should operate at the regional level to maintain 
monetary stability. Its total funding would be about US$ 100 billion with Japan as 
the main contributor. 
                                                          
13 Surprisingly, the idea for an AMF financed by Japan probably came from IMF director Michel 
Camdessus, who feared a shortage of funding for the rescue operations as the United States 
declined to contribute during the early phase of the crisis. Japan’s Vice Finance Minister of 
International Affairs, Eisuke Sakakibara, took up the idea and presented it as his own. Camdessus 
later changed his position as the US Treasury, which had not been informed, began to resist the 
AMF and promised more generous US emergency funds. I thank Robert Wade for this 
information.  
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Tokyo had a strong interest in stabilizing the financial systems of the region. In 
1996 Japanese banks had US$ 265 billion in outstanding loans to East Asian 
countries, and US$ 83.9 billion to the three countries that eventually would have to 
be bailed out, Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea (Altback 1997: 5). A regional 
financial collapse would enhance Japan’s bad debt problem. Tokyo did apparently 
not trust the IMF to solve these problems.  
 
Japan floated the AMF idea during a G-7 meeting in Hong Kong in September 
1997. The EU countries and the IMF immediately objected to the proposal. During 
the annual meeting of the IMF and the World Bank in Hong Kong in 
September/October US Vice Secretary of the Treasury, Larry Summers also 
strongly resisted the initiative.14 The Treasury attempted to accommodate the East 
Asian countries by assuming a greater responsibility for the emergency funds in 
return for an abandonment of the AMF plans. 
 
The Western critics argued that two rivaling monetary funds would create problems 
of ‘moral hazard’ by allowing for access to emergency funds without reform. From 
the Treasury’s viewpoint the AMF would reduce the US influence on the 
adjustment processes and impede liberalization of trade and finance. In particular 
the latter was a major US concern during the crisis. Concern about East Asian 
holdings of Treasuries may also have been important. If regional central banks led 
by the Bank of Japan had sold out from their holdings of Treasuries to finance this 
costly operation, US long-term interest rates would have soared (Johnson 1998: 
658). 
 
China was also resisting the AMF initiative as an effort to impose ‘yen hegemony’ 
on East Asia (Rowley 2000a: 23). In addition to its support of the US/IMF line 
China also contributed to the IMF emergency funds and pledged not to devalue the 
renminbi. The Chinese defense of the reminbi (which also helped the Hong Kong 
monetary authority to maintain its peg) was most important to the stabilization of 
regional currency exchange rates in 1998. These actions sustained China’s rivalry 
with Japan for regional hegemony. By mid-1998 Beijing criticized the Japanese 
                                                          
14 During the conference Japan’s Eisuke Sakakibara called a meeting of senior Asian officials to 
discuss the AMF proposal without informing the US representatives. As Summers learned about 
this meeting he entered the room where the Asians were sitting, sat down at the table and said, 
‘Now, where were we?’ See Wade (1999: 147, note 46). 
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side for allowing the yen to decline.15 China’s pro-IMF line was probably also 
motivated by a strategy of accommodating the United States. In return Beijing 
hoped for US concessions in the ongoing negotiations on China’s entry into the 
WTO (Bowles 2002: 255-257).  
 
Japan withdrew from the AMF proposal and the other East Asian countries 
gradually followed suit. The AMF initiative was abandoned in November 1997. 
APEC’s meeting in Vancouver 23-24 November backed IMF's leadership in the 
financial rescue operation. Shortly afterwards Tokyo announced that its 
contribution to the regional emergency fund ‘only’ would be about US$ 20 billion 
(Rowley 1997). 
 
There is reason to believe that the ‘contagion’ from the Thai crisis could have been 
much reduced if the AMF had been in place by September/October 1997. The 
foreign investors’ knowledge of a US$ 100 billion defense line ready to be issued 
on short notice might had calmed down the market in a period when regional 
currencies, excepting the Thai baht, still were relatively stable (Felix 1998). 
Instead, the Asian financial crisis escalated and reinforced the Japanese crisis in 
late 1997. 
 
The New Miyazawa Initiative  
The ‘contagion’ of the Asian financial crisis was felt in the United States by mid-
1998. US equity prices were depressed and some highly leveraged institutional 
investors, such as hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), were 
caught in a liquidity squeeze. By late September 1998 the US economy was close 
to the brink, and reduced US demand threatened to reinforce the international crisis 
to the point of a full-scale world depression. The Federal Reserve responded with 
organizing a bail-out of LTCM along with three successive reductions of the 
discount rate from late September through mid-November. These actions calmed 
uneasy investors by signaling support of the US stock market and consumption 
boom (Brenner 2000: 20-23). The U.S. interest rate reduction allowed the East 
Asian countries to reduce their interest rates without triggering capital flight. This 
dampened domestic debt problems and sustained domestic demand (Jomo 2001: 
287). The surge of the US economy in 1999 helped East Asian exports.  
 
The US boom relied heavily on foreign inflows of capital, but to a greater extent 
than previously the capital inflow came from Europe, rather than Japan and other 
                                                          
15 China’s words were not always in accordance with her deeds. While China criticized the 
United States and Japan for not doing more to support the yen, the Chinese central bank sold off 
billions of dollars worth from its yen holdings. See Wade and Venoroso 1998b: 27, note 36).  
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East Asian countries. The weakening of economic ties between the United States 
and Japan was accompanied by growing friction over trade policy issues. This 
appears to have been an important background for new Japanese initiatives for 
regional monetary integration that first came in the form of a major Japanese aid 
initiative. 
 
During 1998 US authorities criticized Japan’s handling of its banking crisis as well 
as Japan’s declining imports from the region. The United States enlisted support 
from the G-7 and East Asia for this critique. Japan came under strong pressure to 
expand government deficits and imports to promote regional recovery. At APEC’s 
trade ministers’ meeting in Kuala Lumpur in June 1998 an isolated Japan was 
pressured on ‘Early Voluntary Sector Liberalization’ within marine and forestry 
products. Eventually, the Japanese government responded by launching a massive 
economic stimulus and bank bailout package in October 1998 along with a regional 
aid initiative that diluted the pressure for trade liberalization (Hughes 2000: 232-
233).  
 
At a G-7 meeting in Washington in October 1998 Japan’s Minister of Finance, 
Kiichi Miyazawa presented a US$ 30 billion aid plan in soft credits to Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and South Korea. Loans made under the plan 
would be denominated in yen and tied to projects involving Japanese companies. 
Japan was couching the idea in the context of a broader aid effort involving the G-7 
countries, the IMF and the World Bank, and thus diluted resistance from the United 
States and the IMF. Additional Japanese aid commitments followed in December 
1998 and during spring 1999 (Vatikiotis with Hiebert 1998/99; Castellano 2000: 2). 
These Japanese funds provided an alternative source of emergency credits without 
the stringent conditions that accompanied IMF support.16  
 
One indication of the success of the Japanese initiative was that East Asian 
countries in November 1998 declined to force the ‘Early Voluntary Sector 
Liberalization’ within marine and forestry products through APEC’s agenda. The 
compromise solution was to defer a decision to the WTO (Hughes 2000: 246). But 
apart from trade policy, Tokyo’s regional aid policy was also closely related to its 
efforts to internationalize the yen.  
 
                                                          
16 Christopher Hughes (2000: 222) suggests that the competition from the Miyazawa plan 
pressured the IMF to take a milder stance towards the East Asian countries. 
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Regionalization of the yen  
For a long time it had been a deliberate strategy from the side of Japan’s Ministry 
of Finance (MOF) to reduce the international use of the yen in order to hold down 
the yen exchange rate. However, by mid-1998 the MOF began to advocate the 
internationalization of the yen, focusing on the promoting the yen in East Asia.  
 
It was argued that an internationalization of the yen would enhance the 
competitiveness of Japan’s financial institutions. Japan’s capital market would 
benefit from yen investments by foreigners and the foreign exchange risks of trade 
and capital transactions would be reduced (CFEOT 1998, 1999). The pressure to 
market Japan’s government debt may have played an important role in these 
deliberations.  
 
MOF has managed the government debt through a controlled system of government 
bond purchases. The bonds have been sold to banks and security firms with no 
choice but to follow the MOF’s request and to the MOF’s trust fund bureau, which 
is funded by the postal savings system. These measures have kept bond rates and 
long-term interest rates low. But the banking crisis had reduced the banks’ capacity 
to purchase unprofitable bonds, and the postal saving system has become 
increasingly burdened. The government is then under pressure to turn to ‘real’ bond 
markets at home and abroad. Bond rates and long-term interest rates must then be 
raised (Murphy 2000: 37-38, 50). Accordingly, the marketing of Japanese 
government securities internationally has become a main concern. By 
internationalizing the yen Japan may be able to attract East Asian current account 
surpluses into government bonds.  
 
The Euro was launched in 1999. The MOF predicted that it would become a strong 
competitor to the dollar with ‘Euroland’, Central and East Europe and Africa as its 
main area (CFEOT 1999: 4). A monetary triadization of the world economy was 
imminent, but the yen was lagging behind in this process, because of its limited use 
in East Asia. The Asian crisis provided an opportunity for a change of the regional 
monetary regime as most East Asian countries unlinked their currencies from the 
dollar. MOF claimed that the pegging of regional currencies to the dollar had been 
a major cause of the 1997 crisis and recommended that East Asian currencies wee 
tied to a basket consisting of the US dollar, the Euro, and the yen.  
 
In a speech in April 1999 Miyazawa, argued that East Asian savings were invested 
in the West, while the region relied on unstable capital flows from US and 
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European investors.17 These financial flows should be redirected to go within East 
Asia. Japan would play a key role at the center of the regional financial flows, 
channeling aid and public investment to the region. Internationalization of the yen, 
financial liberalization, the creation of new financial instruments and tax rebates 
would attract regional yen holdings into private and public securities (Miyazawa 
1999). 
 
Regionalization of the yen was also promoted through Japan’s foreign aid. Loans 
made under the Miyazawa plan were denominated in yen. In addition, it has been 
discussed to use aid loans to promote yen-denominated exports from poor East 
Asian countries to Japan to shield these countries from uncertainties relating to the 
volatile yen/dollar exchange rate (Yahoo 2000). 
 
Regional currency swaps  
The discussion so far has mainly focused on the role of Japanese initiatives. Yet in 
May 2000 a new regional initiative for monetary co-operation was launched within 
the ASEAN+3 framework in a meeting of finance ministers in Chiang Mai. A 
network of bilateral currency swap arrangements should ensure that countries with 
significant currency reserves would lend foreign currency, mainly dollars, to 
defend the exchange rates of their neighbors. Japan was a driving force.  
 
The Miyazawa Plan of autumn 1998 had included bilateral currency swap 
agreements with South Korea and Malaysia. These arrangements were extended 
under the Chiang Mai framework. Six bilateral swap arrangements between Japan-
Korea, Japan-Thailand, Japan-the Philippines, Japan-Malaysia, China-Thailand, 
and China-Japan have been concluded and signed since the Chiang Mai Agreement 
with a combined size of US$ 17 billion. Another eight bilateral agreements are 
being negotiated, while the existing swap arrangements between Japan-Korea and 
Japan-Malaysia with the combined size of US$ 7.5 billion have been renewed. 
                                                          
17 Miyazawa was echoing the argument presented during the September 1997 IMF/World Bank 
meeting in Hong Kong by Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary authority, Joseph Yam: 
‘Much of Asian savings, in particular official sector savings and private sector savings that have 
been institutionalised, are still invested in assets of OECD countries ... [M]ore than 80 per cent of 
total Asian foreign exchange reserves amounting to US$ 600 billion are invested largely in North 
America and Europe ... It can be argued therefore that Asia is financing much of the budget 
deficit of developed economies, particularly the United States, but has to try hard to attract 
money back into the region through foreign investments. And the volatility of foreign portfolio 
investments has been a major cause of disruptions to the monetary and financial systems of the 
Asian economies. Some have even gone so far as to say that the Asian economies are providing 
the funding to hedge funds in non-Asian countries to play havoc with their currencies and 
financial markets’. See Yam (1997: 9-10). 
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There has also been extensive discussion within the ASEAN+3 on the pegging of 
regional currencies to some ‘basket’ of the dollar, the yen and the Euro, rather than 
to the dollar (ASEAN homepage; Bello 2000; Chiu 2002; Rowley 2000a, b). 
 
Through these actions the problems of establishing, a formal institution which 
might counter US opposition has been bypassed. This strategy has apparently been 
successful. Reportedly the US representatives at the ADB meeting in Chiang Mai 
were not amused when the currency swap plans surprisingly were announced. Yet 
the United States has kept a low profile, while IMF’s managing director Horst 
Kohler has said that an Asian Monetary Fund that is complementary to the IMF is 
acceptable (Liu 2002). 
 
Another impediment against the AMF was Chinese resistance. As was previously 
noted, China’s support of the US/IMF line during 1997/98 was motivated by its 
interest in obtaining concessions from the United States in negotiations regarding 
China’s WTO accession. However, these hopes were frustrated. During 1999 
relations between the United States and China were rapidly declining following the 
US bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade in the war with Yugoslavia and the 
issuing of the ‘Cox Report’ with a hawkish position on China. By mid-1999 
Beijing had abandoned the strategy of accommodating the United States. It now 
took a greater interest in regional arrangements and supported the process leading 
up to the May 2000 Chiang Mai proposal (Bowles 2002: 257-258). Apparently 
China and Japan sorted out their differences prior to the meeting and found a 
formula that smacked less of ‘yen hegemony’. 
  
Conclusion 
This paper has identified US hegemony and regional suspicion of Japan, especially 
from China, as major obstacles to East Asian regional monetary integration. The 
process leading up to the Chiang Mai framework may have succeeded in removing 
these obstacles with regard to the regional pooling of monetary resources for 
emergencies. It is however much harder to dispense with the regional dollar bloc 
and expand the order to promote increased use of regional currencies, especially the 
yen.  
 
The link between monetary seigniorage and the US role as East Asia’s ‘consumer 
of last resort’ may be a strong impediment to East Asian monetary integration. As 
was noted in section 2, US seigniorage has allowed for two decades of huge current 
account deficits to the benefit of East Asian exporters. The lowering of the US 
interest rate in 1998 helped East Asia to lower its own interest rates and export its 
way out of the crisis. Given East Asia’s large export share to the United States, 
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there is likely to be great reluctance among East Asian governments against 
engaging in forms of economic regionalism that might trigger retaliatory US 
protectionist measures and jeopardize US export markets. 
 
A future East Asian ‘de-dollarization’ can be prepared by an increase in intra-
regional trade through further expansion of intra-regional producer networks, and – 
especially – through finished goods trade. The proposals for an ASEAN+3 Free 
Trade Zone might possibly be one step in this direction. However, Chinese–
Japanese rivalry is a possible impediment. For instance China’s proposal for a free 
trade zone including itself and ASEAN has recently been countered by a Japanese 
proposal for an East Asia Free Trade Zone including most of East Asia, and 
possibly also Australia, New Zealand and the United States! (Nyt fra Asien 2002).18 
What the outcome of this rivalry might be remains to be seen.  
 
Increased Japanese imports from the region is key to the promotion of East Asian 
trade. Formal trade agreements may not suffice for this purpose. It may also require 
a major change of the strategy of Japanese companies towards increased foreign 
investment in production for Japanese markets. As Japan’s economic stagnation 
continues, it is however unlikely that this change will take place.  
 
East Asia’s dependence on the United States may also be reduced ‘by default’ 
through a major crash and import contraction in the United States. In case of 
recession or stagnation in the United States as well as in Japan the East Asian 
governments may finally face a tough choice which they have been postponing for 
decades thanks to the US role as the region’s ‘consumer of last resort’. A new 
home-market oriented development strategy might be needed, e.g. through 
improved public welfare. This would require a change of deeply rooted policies and 
power relations oriented to constraining domestic consumption. This would be an 
extremely difficult task, requiring greater autonomy of East Asian states towards 
their upper classes than seen so far, based on new class alliances which included 
East Asian lower classes.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 Paul Bowles (2002: 260-262) relates the new Japanese interest in regional trade arrangements 
to MITI’s (currently METI, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) effort at promoting 
Japanese interests in multilateral trade negotiations through a regional framework.  
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